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ABSTRACT

This document examines the definition of democracy and the political attitudes and values of the West German public and implications of these attitudes for future German politics and German-U.S. relations. The stability of postwar democracy in West Germany, it is agreed, is related to changes in the characteristics of the political culture over the last 40 years, and reflects a consensus on democratic values and institutions never before present in German political history. Five reasons for these changes are identified: social structure, policy success, political socialization, absence of a credible alternative, and the postwar international economy. The paper discusses two decades of survey data that examine the political attitudes, social beliefs, and democratic values. One of the surveys asked respondents to describe their concept of an ideal democracy. The results showed between 70 and 90 percent of the West German adult population were supportive of basic democratic institutions, values, and norms. Tables of survey finding are included. (NL)

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How Democratic is the Federal Republic? The Remade Political Culture at 40

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Paper Presented at the Conference on The Development of Democracy after World War II in Germany, Europe, and the United States
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How Democratic is the Federal Republic?

The Remade Political Culture at 20

The question posed in the title of this essay can be examined either in terms of some absolute, ideal-type, conception of democracy or comparatively, that is by examining certain key aspects of modern German politics and comparing them with other political systems commonly considered to be democratic. I would like to do both. First by presenting a widely used definition of democracy, applying it to the Federal Republic, and then comparing the Federal Republic's political performance with more established political systems. Then with the help of the ever-present public opinion poll we can briefly examine the question of how the West German public defines democracy and how the Federal Republic measures up to this definition.

In the second part of this paper, I will turn to the question of Germany's postwar political culture, i.e. the political attitudes and values of German mass publics. The stability of the postwar democracy is, I suggest, closely related to changes in the political culture, a culture I have termed "remade".(1) I propose to examine the major characteristics of this culture, the changes that have taken place over the past forty years, and the factors which have produced these changes. Finally, this essay will briefly explore the implications of these changes for the future of German politics and especially German-American relations.

There is no shortage of definitions or conceptions of democracy, but generally they can be divided into two general categories. For some democracy is a set of<u>procedures</u> for making political decisions. For

others democracy is more about the substance of politics, specifically social and economic equality.(2) For this latter conception, democracy is impossible without the collective ownership of the means of production. (3) Still others tend to define democracy in terms of minority rights, i.e. in terms of what government cannot do. Few of the procedural conceptions of democracy, however, preclude policies which create a egalitarian social and economic order. The Bonn constitution, for example, in Article 15 allows for the socialization of the means of production with proper compensation. For the purposes of this study, we will use a definition developed some years ago by Robert A. Dahl. Democracy, for Dahl, is a political system "one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all of its citizens."(4) For such a responsiveness, a democratic political system must also provide citizens "unimpaired opportunities" to 1) formulate their preferences; 2) signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; and 3) have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of the government, that is weighted with no discrimination because of the content, or source of the preference.(5)

Table One About Here

The Dahl conception of democracy is summarized in Table 1. Even a cursory examination of these requirements indicates that the West German system is certainly a prime candidate for membership in the community of political democracies. The freedom to form and join organizations, to express preferences, to vote, to run for public office, to compete for public support, to have access to alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutional structures making government

Table 1

Some Requirements
for a Democracy
Among a Large Number of People

For the Opportunity to:	The Following Institutional Guarantees are Required:
I. Formulate Preferences	1. Freedom to form and join organizations. 2. Freedom of Expression 3. Right to vote 4. Right of political leaders to compete for support. 5. Alternative sources of information.
II. Signify Preferences	1. Freedom to form and join organizations. 2. Freedom of expression. 3. Right to Vote 4. Eligibility for public office. 5. Right of political leaders to compete for support. 6. Alternative sources of information. 7. Free and Fair Elections.
III. Have Preferences weighted equally in conduct of government	1. Freedom to form and join organizations. 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Eligibility for public office. 5. Right of political leaders to compete for support (votes) 6. Alternative sources of information. 7. Free and fair elections. 8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Source: Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 3.

policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference are all present in some form in the Federal Republic. Of course, no political system in the past or present measure up completely to these standards. And the Federal Republic, in spite of the formal guarantees of all eight of the requirements listed in Table 1, has had its shortcomings. In the area of civil liberties, for example, one is reminded of the Spiegel affair of the early 1960s, the Radikalenerlass or Berufsverbot issue of the 1970s, and the controveries over the census and the limitations on demonstrations (Vermummungsverbot) in the 1980s. The Federal Republic has also no lacked for scandals of varying degrees and intensity some of which have involved the political parties and political leaders, other dealing with improper governmental, business, and trade union actions.

Table 2 About Here

There are also people in the Federal Republic who feel that they are not free to form or join organizations, or express themselves freely, or that the political institutions of the Republic are not responsive to their wishes. No, the Federal Republic is not a perfect or even ideal democracy. Yet by comparative or international standards its performance over the last forty years must be rated positively.

Probably the best evaluators of a democracy are the citizens themselves. Since 1973 the European Community has conducted regular surveys of citizens in its members' countries, the Eurobarometer. One of the questions almost always asked in these surveys relates directly to our first point: popular evaluation of the political system. The question text is simply "On the whole, to what extent would you say you are satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?" (Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, Not at all satisfied).

In Germany and the other older members of the community, this question has been asked on twenty-four different occassions from 1973 to 1988. (Unfortunately, I do not have the figure for the April, 1989 survey, which would be the twenty-fifth). In Table 2 we show the average level over this period for each country and the range (the highest and lowest level.) No country in the community has had a higher level of satisfaction with democracy during the past fifteen years than the Federal Republic. On average over 70 percent of the population has been either "very" or "fairly" satisfied with democracy; the low point over this period was 44 percent and the highest level 80 percent. These figures also correspond to early surveys conducted before 1973 by German polling organizations (6), which also tapped the population's general satisfaction with political democracy. Denmark has the second average highest level of satisfaction followed by Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece and Great Britain. Other studies have also found that a larger proportion of the German public believes that their political order ensures freedom of expression and the legal rights of citizens than in more established democracies such as Britain and France.(7)

There are numerous other studies conducted by a wide range of scholars with differing methods and conceptual frameworks.(8) The thrust of all this work is the same: German has become a vital and dynamic political democracy. But what conceptions of "democracy" do modern Germans have? And how has this consensus on political democracy come about? How can we explain these changes?

CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

The contemporary image or conception of democracy held by the West German public was one theme of a 1978 nation-wide survey. In this study

Table 2
Satisfaction with Democracy:
European Community, 1973-1988

Country	Mean Percent "Very" or "Fairly" Satisfied	Range (in percent) Low	High
Germany	72	44	80
Denmark	65	45	74
Luxembourg	62	52	77
Netherlands	59	50	69
Greece (1980-1988)	56	51	61
Great Britain	55	44	64
Ireland	53	43	71
Portugal (1985-1988)	53	34	70
Spain (1985-1988)	50	44	56
Belgium	45	34	62
France	44	36	53
Italy	23	12	36

Source, Eurobarometer, No. 30, pp. B1-B24.

the respondents were asked with the aid of a list containing twenty items to describe the "ideal democracy": What was needed for a society to be fully democractic? Later in the interview the respondents were asked to judge the extent to which these same characteristics or requisites of an "ideal democracy" were actually present in the Federal Republic. The two questions thus enable us to compare a more abstract or ideal conception of democracy with the present political order in the Federal Republic. The responses to the two questions are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 About Here

The divergence between the ideal democracy and the actual democracy in the Federal Republic is greatest in two related areas: citizen participation and "socio-economic democracy." Those Germans who conceive of democracy as a system with frequent, extensive and direct citizen involvement in decision-making see the Federal Republic as falling short in this area. Likewise, the 55 percent of the adult population who identify democracy with increasing economic equality and worker or employee involvement in the industrial enterprise (co-determination) is not satisfied that this has been realized in West Germany. Note, however, that the proportion of the population that has this conception of democracy is far smaller than that which thinks of democracy in liberal or procedural terms: individual liberty, free elections, competitive parties, freedom of religion. "Procedural Democrats" are quite content with the accomplishments of the Second Republic. Those who want democracy expanded (Substantive Democrats), however, are far from satisfied. This gap between the ideal and the real affords one explanation for the emergence of new social movements

Table 3

CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

	Needed for Democracy	Actually Present in the Federal Republic	Difference
	%	%	%
Political Competition	79	90	+11
Freedom of Movement (Travel)	80	87	+7
Religious Freedom	78	87	+9
Freedom of Expression, Press	86	76	-10
Free Elections	75	82	+7
Political Equality	72	79	+7
Political Opposition	67	66	-1
Independent Judiciary	69	62	-7
Equality before the Law	85	56	-29
Freedom to Choose an Occupation	79	52	-27
Federalism	43	68	+25
Effective Co-Determination in Industry	55	46	-9
Citizenry Capable of Direct Participation in Policy Making	53	35	-18
Responsive Political Elite	63	32	-31
Freedom from Want, Distress	60	34	-26
Referenda on Important Policy Policy Issues	56	26	-30
An Army for Internal Security	34	26	-8
Direct Popular Participation in Policy-Making	51	26	-25
Non-Discrimination against Extremists	36	11	-25
Only Moderate Differences in Income	35	9	-26

Source: Institut fuer Demoskopie, Survey No. 3061

Table 4
The Democratic Consensus

Item	Consensus Level*
	%
Political Competition	76
Freedom of Movement (Travel)	74
Freedom of Religion	73
Freedom of Expression, Press	70
Free Elections	69
Political Equality	63
Political Opposition	53
Independent Judiciary	51
Equality before the Law	51
Freedom to Choose and Occupation	45
Federalism	38
Effective Co-Determination in Industry	31
Citizenry Capable of Direct Participation in Policy Making	25
Responsive Political Elite	25
Freedom from Want, Distress	24
Referenda on Important Policy Issues	21
An Army for Internal Security	18
Direct Popular Participation in Policy Making	18
Non-Discrimination against Extremists	7
Only Moderate Differences in Income	5

*proportion of total agreeing that the item is essential to a democracy and is present in the Federal Republic.
Source: See Table 3

(Buergerinitiativen, womens' rights groups, peace groups) in recent years and their demand for referenda on major policy issues, most notably of course, nuclear power.

By combining the responses to the two questions, the contemporary image of political democracy held by the population and the extent of its realization in the Federal Republic can be determined. We suggest that a concensus on a particular value, norm or condition is present when the respondent perceives that the condition is both important for any democracy and is actually present in the Federal Republic. The consensus or congruence between the ideal and the actual political democracy for the twenty items is presented in Table 4. Clearly, the liberal or procedural conception of democracy is the most widely shared in the Federal Republic today: political competition or choice (several competing parties), freedom of speech, press and movement (the latter especially salient because of the DDR and the Wall), free elections, and one man, one vote. On all of these items there is a high degree of agreement that they are important to a political democracy and can be found in the Federal Republic.

Table 4 About Here

When democracy however, is conceived in terms of substantive policy outputs, especialy of a socio-economic character, and as a system with widespread and direct popular participation, the degree of consensus drops sharply (Table 4). Only 45 percent of the population believes that in a democracy the freedom to choose an occupation is important and that such a condition exists in the Federal Republic. Co-determination in industry, freedom from want, referenda, and direct popular participation in policy-making are identified with democracy in the Federal Republic

by less than a third of the population. Tolerance of political extremists and the absence of large income differences have consensus levels of less than ten per cent.

On two items there is a strong consensus, but in a negative direction. That is, about two-thirds of the adult population does not believe that the army in a democracy has a role in internal security and 57 percent of the total sample does not perceive the Bundeswehr playing such a role in the Federal Republic. A similar proportion (65 percent) takes a very hard line towards members of extremist political parties. In an ideal democracy suppporters of extremist parties should expect to be "disadvantaged" and 60 percent perceive this to be the case in the Federal Republic.

The ideological position of the respondents relates to their evaluation of what is needed for an ideal democracy and what is actually present in the Federal Republic most significantly in five areas: (1) The army as an internal security force. While 75 percent of the left group reject this as a characteristic of a democracy, 59 percent of those on the right and 68 percent of those in the middle of the ideological spectrum made this judgment; (2) Industrial co-determination. About two-thirds of the "left" regarded workers' participation in corporate enterprises as an essential condition of a democracy as compared to 49 percent of the right group and 54 percent in the center; Tolerance or non-discrimination of those in extremist political parties. While 55 percent of the left took the position that members of extremist parties should not be automatically discriminated against, only 28 percent on the right and 33 percent of the center shared this view; (4) Economic or income differences: about half of the

left respondents, as compared to 29 percent on the right and 35 percent of the center group accept the notion that in a democracy "the income differences should not be too large." The relatively low level of support among the left for this item again indicates the extent to which the dominant conception of democracy in the Federal Republic is still liberal and procedural rather than radical or substantive; (5) Freedom to choose an occupation. This item could also be interpreted as a surrogate for social mobility. Almost 60 percent of the left respondents do not believe that Germans have the right to freely choose their occupation as compared to 43 percent on the right and 48 percent of the center group. The importance of education as a requisite for such a free choice and the still significant class bias in the educational system are factors which perhaps underlie these responses.

THE REMADE POLITICAL CULTURE AT 40

West Germany's political culture--the values, attitudes and opinions of its citizens toward politics--has been intensively studied during the four decades of the Republic's existence. The state of this culture has been by no means a purely academic concern, but an important political question throughout most of this period. The victorious Western allies together with segments of the post-war German political elite were sceptical and uneasy about the capacity of Germans to measure up to the demands of citizenship in a liberal, representative democracy. Supporting this view was a large academic literature which emphasized the relative absence of democratic values and norms in the culture and the dominance of various forms of authoritarianism. (9) Although a socio-economically modern society with a "model" democratic constitution after 1919 that attitudes and values supportive of democracy were not

sufficiently present among the great mass of the populace. The bulk of the citizenry, it was argued, enthusiastically supported the Third Reich at least until the outbreak of war in 1939 and could hardly be expected, in spite of Nazism's crushing defeat, to become convinced democrats overnight.

Thus the postwar constitution emphasized the representative rather than the plebiscitary or participatory aspect of democratic government. No significant political official was to be directly elected, nor could elected officials be recalled by the electorate. Referenda were only sanctioned at the Land and in some areas local level. Popular participation was in effect limited to periodic voting; the actual process of policy-making was restricted to party, interest group, and bureaucratic elites well-insulated from direct popular influence.

At the same time the public was carefully watched and studied through the medium of public opinion polls, commissioned in many cases by various governmental and party agencies. The majority of these surveys focused on one central question: were German political and social attitudes changing in the direction of more supportive orientations towards the institutions, values and processes of liberal democracy, or would the postwar system suffer the same fate as its predecessor and become a "Republic without Republicans"?

These surveys provide us with a unique opportunity to examine the process of cultural change which was occurred. Over the past two decades the analysis of these data has produced a sizeable literature.(10) SIgnificantly, in spite of different analytical techniques, theoretical approaches and data bases, the numerous scholars working in this area are in general agreement on the basic pattern and

trends during the past thirty years.

(1) The early post-war years were characterized by a widespread indifference to politics of any kind. Most Germans, reacting to the intense politization of the Nazi years, had withdrawn to their primary (personal life, family, friends) sphere of concern. This indifferent majority had little understanding of basic democratic values and institutions. For example, in 1949 Germans by a 2-1 margin preferred a government which would guarantee economic and social security over one which guaranteed democratic freedoms.(11) Only about half of the adult population in 1950 wanted more than one party to participate in political life and less than 50 percent felt that a parliament was needed. There was also significant (about 20-30 percent) residual support for past regimes: the Hohenzollern Monarchy and National Socialism.(12) Opposition to the postwar Republic was, however, largely passive and latent. Suppporters of the Monarchy or the Nazis were no more likely to participate actively in political life during these years than those indifferent to politics and were significantly less active than supporters of the Republic.

(2) The emergence in the mid-1950s of an "instrumental" or specific attachment to the postwar system. Policy successes, above all the "economic miracle" produced a widespread sense that "the system works" and was therefore worthy of support. Much of Konrad Adenauer's electoral appeal and the success of the Christian Democrats in the 1950s was based on this theme. The five-nation political culture of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, included Germany and was based on a survey conducted in 1959. In comparison with such "established" democracies as Great Britain and the United States, Germans in 1959 had an "output

oriented, detached, over-pragmatic, almost cynical attitude toward politics. There was a "lack of commitment to the political system independent of system output." Political participation, communication and interest were also low in comparison to Britain and the United States. But above all, according to this study, there was little "system affect" or emotional attachment to the Bonn Republic; no "reservoir of good-will" which could see it through a major crisis. This interpretation, which essentially implied that postwar German democracy, while stable and functioning well, could not survive a major social or economic crisis, dominated much of the scholarly writing about the Federal Republic throughout the 1960s and even well into the 1970s.

(3) The analysis of time-series data, however, from the early 1950s until the present has found significant changes in the Almond and Verba portrait. By the mid-1960s the substantial support found earlier for the Monarchy and National Socialism in the early 1950s had largely disappeared. Between 70 and 90 percent of the adult population were supportive of basic democratic institutions, values and norms: parliament, representation, political competition, freedom of expression. Moreover, these high support levels were overtime becoming widespread across all major socio-economic strata. Even those citizens who did not benefit, for example, from the economic miracle were by the mid-1960s nonetheless supportive of the system's basic structures and processes. In fact much of the aggregate change in support from the 1950s to the early 1970s came from less advantaged groups (lower income, education, occupation) and those opposed to the CDU governments of Adenauer and Erhard.

(4) The fourth trend dates from the late 1960s and is characterized

by mass behavioral change consistent with the learning of political values and norms which took place earlier. In short, having learned and accepted democratic norms and values, the Germans were now starting to put them into practice. The Machtwechsel of 1969, the student movement, the Buergerinitiativen, the Greens and the new social movements--peace movement, environmental groups, womens' right groups-- are the most obvious manifestations of this development. By the 1980s millions of Germans were engaging in political activities beyond the simple act of voting. From 1974 to 1981 the proportion of West Germans who had signed petitions for some type of political cause or issue had jumped from 30 percent to 46 percent. Participation in lawful demonstrations increased from 9 percent to 14 percent over this same period (13). Between 1973 and 1984 the proportion of Germans stating that they considered such activities as citizen initiative groups, collecting petitions, talking with politicians and demostrating to be "effective means toward achieving certain goals" also increased. By 1984, for example, 75 percent approved of citizen initiative groups and over 40 percent supported demonstrations as an effective political tool(14). Many Germans no longer want just a "spectator democracy" (Zuschauerdemokratie), but a "participatory democracy" (Teilnehmer Demokratie). During this stage, which we are still in, the issue of national identity, patriotism, and Germany's future political role in Europe have also become linked with the process of cultural change.

THE MISSING LINK IN THE REMADE POLITICAL CULTURE?

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DIFFUSE SUPPORT

Comparative studies of national pride have consistently found West

Germans to have the lowest level of pride in among Western industrialized societies. The proportion who report that they are "very proud" of being German is only about 20 percent as compared to 40-50 percent for the French and British and well over 80 percent for Americans (even before Reagan). Interestingly, the other country with a low level of pride is Japan. This low level of pride is related in large part to a residual sense of shame and guilt over the events of the Third Reich which are attributed to an excess of national pride. Generally, political scientists consider a sense of national pride and identity to be an important requisite for a system's legitimacy and levels of diffuse support, i.e the reservoir of good will toward the country that can be drawn on in times of poor system performance.

Table 5 About Here

German national pride, however, in addition to being lower than most other European democracies is also more strongly related to popular satisfaction with how democracy is functioning than in other countries. As Table 5 shows, levels of national pride in Germany vary strongly by system satisfaction. Among Germans "very satisfied" with how democracy is functioning, 41 percent are proud of their country as compared to only 17 percent for those respondents "not at all satisfied" with the functioning of democracy. In no other country is this relationship as strong as it is in the Federal Republic. This suggests that national pride is not contributing to diffuse support to the same extent as in other democracies. The relative youth of the Federal Republic, its official "provisional" character, the absence of national symbols and patriotic myths all contribute to both the low level of pride and its close relationship to system performance. At present, a traditional

Table 5

National Pride and Satisfaction with Democracy: Major European Countries, 1984

(in percent)

Country	Satisfaction with Democracy				
	Very Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Not Very Satisfied	Not at all Satisfied	Gamma
Germany	41	19	13	17	.42
Netherlands	45	36	39	37	.09
France	63	39	37	39	.16
Italy	69	49	42	39	.17
Britain	70	52	46	50	.22

Source: Eurobarometer, No. 21, 1984

sense of national pride is not a source of diffuse support for the Federal Republic.

A number of analysts in Germany, across a wide ideological spectrum, have become concerned about this low level of national pride. Conservatives, for example, point to relationships between national pride and the willingness to defend the country: the lower the level of pride, the lower the interest in defending the country (15). They contend that the Federal Republic is hindered in its dealings with other nations by its lack of a national identity and pride comparable to that found in other countries. One major obstacle, they argue, to the development of such an identity is an excessive focus on the Third Reich by historians, educators, and the media, which burdens younger generations with an unjustified sense of guilt. They stress that German history is long and complex and that even during the period from 1933 to 1945 there were phenomena other than National Socialism. A country which is obessed with guilt, they maintain, will incapable of dealing with the challenges of the future. To counteract this, conservatives want to create and stress common, positive historical memories and traditions.

Many liberal and socialist intellectuals have been very critical of what they believe is an attempt by conservatives to gloss over, or relativize the singularlity of the Nazi experience and especially the Holocaust. The debate has been particularly intense among several leading historians and social scientists. The Historikerstreit attracted national attention in 1986 when a leading social philosopher, Juergen Habermas, accused two historians, Ernst Nolte and the late Andreas Hillgruber, of seeking to trivalize the Nazi period. He linked

their efforts to a larger movement among conservative historians to create a new view of the past which would "limit the damage" done by the Third Reich and give Germans confidence and pride.

While not denying the need for national identity, Habermas urged Germans to focus their patriotism and pride on the open, democratic society that has developed in the past forty years:

> The creation of such a society was the greatest achievement of the postwar generation, for it opened Germany unconditionally to the political culture of the West...The only patriotism that will not alienate us from the West is constitutional patriotism. Unfortunately, a tie to universal constitutional principles that is based on conviction has only been possible in Germany since, and because of Auschwitz. Anyone who wants to drive the blush of shame over that deed from our cheeks by using meaningless phrases like 'obession with guilt', anyone who wants to call Germans back to a conventional kind of identity, destroys the only reliable basis of our tie to the West.(16)

His charges were sharply denied by the historians and the debate continued for several months in the pages of West Germany's leading newspapers and periodicals. This Historikerstreit illustrates how difficult and sensitive the question of national identity has become in the Federal Republic. But this dispute also shows that the question of

national identity will in some form be a part of the German political debate in the years to come. Such a discussion would not have been possible two or three decades ago. The national identity problem is thus also an example of cultural change.

The Greens and the Remade Political Culture

Since their appearance on the political scene in the late 1970s the Green political party has been viewed by some analysts on both sides of the Atlantic as an extremist, anti-system movement, reminiscent of Germany's anti-democratic past. In some ways, however, the Greens with their emphasis on grass-roots democracy, participation, and non-violence could be regarded as the products of this cultural change. Do the Greens accept the rules of the democratic game, or do they want "another kind of Republic?"

Table 6 About Here

Tables 6 and 7 present data on specific and diffuse support drawn from surveys conducted in 1982/83. Respondents were first asked whether the political system of the Federal Republic was just and fair and whether it protected basic human liberties and civil rights. Later in the survey the respondents were asked whether the government's policies were just and fair and protected human liberties and civil rights. From the analysis presented in these tables it is clear that the Greens, as expected, do not consider the Kohl government to be very just and fair (this response may reflect the 1982-1983 cutbacks in social welfare and education programs), or very protective of civil liberties. But when asked about the political system's performance in these areas, the Green support level rises sharply. Most Greens, but certainly fewer than

Table 6
Diffuse System Support by Party Preference

(in percent)

The political system of the Federal Republic:

Party Preference:	Protects Citizens' Basic Liberties			Is Just and Fair		
	Agree[1]	Disagree[2]	Other, don't know	Agree[1]	Disagree[2]	Other don't know
CDU/CSU	93	3	4	93	4	3
FDP	88	7	5	88	7	5
SPD	85	12	3	81	15	4
Greens	64	32	4	63	34	3
Tau_b=		.12			.14	

[1]Agree= Strongly agree, agree

[2]Disagree= Strongly disagree, disagree

Source: 1982-83 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Mannheim) Election Study

supporters of the "established parties", do accept the system as legitimate.

Table 7 About Here

The Greens began as a protest party determined to fundamentally change the major policy direction which the established parties had followed during the first thirty years of the Republic. But in recent years we have found that in their quest to capture modern West Germany, the party itself is being captured by that society. The Greens, in short, are becoming more established. Their voters and supporters, while still young, now extend into older age groups. As Green voters age, they remain Green (17). Their level of satisfaction with the West German political system increased between 1983 and 1987 (the relationship between Green support and system satisfaction jumped from r=.19 to .34). Green supporters in 1987 were economically better off than in 1983. More professional, white-collar workers voted for the party.Their support was less concentrated among university students in 1987 than in 1983 (18).

There is no inconsistency, of course, between these changes in Green support from 1983 to 1987 and the recent changes in the party's elites and its actions, i.e. the coalitions with the SPD in Berlin and Hamburg, the control by the Realist faction, the increased contacts with the SPD over a possible government following the 1990 elections. Changes in attitudes, values and structure, however, in this case preceded changes in behavior.

EXPLAINING CHANGE

What factors can explain these changes in political culture? First in discussing change we must distinguish between specifically German

Table 7

Specific System Support by Party Preference

The present federal government:

Party Preference	Protects Citizens' Basic Liberties			Conducts Itself in a just and fair manner		
	Agree[1]	Disagree[2]	Other, Don't Know	Agree[1]	Disagree[2]	Other, Don't Know
CDU/CSU	94	3	3	93	5	2
FDP	88	10	2	75	20	5
SPD	67	25	8	46	47	7
Greens	43	51	6	21	72	7
Tau_b		.20			.29	

[1] Agree = Strongly agree, agree

[2] Disagree = Strongly disagree, disagree

Source: See Table 6

factors anad those sources that are transnational in scope. Until the 1960s, most change could be explained by specific German factors: the Umbruch as the Third Reich collapsed, the Allied occupation, the loss of the Eastern territories, the division of the country, the policy successes of the first national governments. Since the 1960s the transnational impact of post-industrialism has been more apparent. Post-materialism, value change, new political issues, and new social movements can be found throughout Western Europe and are not restricted to Germany. Their impact is perhaps greater in Germany, which experienced more of a break with the past in 1945 than other European countries.

Social Structure

Germany's social structure changed drastically as a result of the war, postwar occupation and the eventual division of the country. The Federal Republic is a more integrated, homogenous society than its predecessors. The loss of the Eastern territories, while traumatic in the short-run, had several long-term advantages. These areas had been an economic drain on the prewar Reich and a source of political instability. The area was also overwhelmingly Protestant and its lost meant that there would be religious parity in the Federal Republic and the end of the Catholic minority, Lager mentality. What has left of German agriculture after the war was also easier to integrate into the postwar social structure. Other significant changes because of the war took place in the family, postwar elites, and regionalism.

Policy Successes

In the early years of the Republic the policy successes of the first Adenauer governments were also important in generating at least specific

support for the new political system. The Wirtschaftswunder, European Community, integration of the refugees, acceptance into the Atlantic Alliance, restoration of sovereignty, reconstruction and expansion of the extensive welfare system were all important and early signs that the Federal Republic, unlike its Weimar predecessor, would not be identified as ineffective. In later years, support for the system becomes more diffused; that is, not related to specific policy success. The impact of this factor has diminished over time.

Political Socialization

In explaining change one must also point to the process of political socializaton in the postwar period. The German schools, churches, media and voluntary organizations have done a better job of socializing the postwar generations to political democracy than many commentators have given them credit for. Many of the attempted American reforms of the occupation period in education, the trade unions and business organizations did eventually take root in the Federal Republic. A study several years ago by Gerda Lederer offers striking proof of this development. She compared a sample of German and American school children with the same authoritarianism questionnaire that had been used in 1945 on corresponding samples of German and American children. The German school children not only had caught up to the Americans by the end of the 1970s, they had become in several areas, less authoritarian than US school children (19).

The Absence of a Credible Alternative

Political democracy could also take hold in postwar Germany because there was no credible, legitimate alternative to what the Western occupiers offered. By 1945 Germany had exhausted all of the indigenous

regime alternatives. The limited, tutelary democracy established in 1945 was quite consistent with the passivity and privatization of the postwar mass publics. With the passage of time support for past alternatives diminished.

The Postwar International Economy

Finally, in recent years students of international political economy have added yet another explanation for Germany's postwar transformation: the openness of the postwar economy, i.e. its dependence on international trade for its domestic well being. Ronald Rogowski succinctly summarizes this argument:

> West Germany since 1949...has depended incontrovertibly on trade (in strong contrast to united Germany between 1871 and 1945) and, because of U.S. hegemony, has borne far smaller military burdens than the Reich ordinarily had. Do these changes account for a political style that has been spectacularly more amicable and stable than those of the Empire or of Weimar?(20)

Similarly, Charles S. Maier contends that the postwar transformation of Germany from a "lion into a lamb, or at least a beaver" is the result of the Federal Republic's integration into the postwar Western international economy set up by the United States (21). The United States established a postwar structure which rewarded democratic behavior and the Germans responded. Germany found in the United States a postwar ideological model, economic investor and protective power. The Federal Republic in exchange had to accept Western, liberal political forms.

This argument, of course, assigns little importance to individual-level attitude change and suggests that if Germany's role in the international capitalist economy should change, so would German political behavior. While Maier contends that he is not arguing that the "Germans today are not democratic", he is really not so sure. For in the conclusion of his essay he states that Germany today is at a crossroads between "political conceptions...it is weighing the calcuable utility of the West orientation of prosperity and a functioning Republic against the uncertain temptation of a more comprehensive, but potentially verhaengnisvolle political future."(19) But if the Germans today are democrats, why would they consider risking the "functioning Republic" for an uncertain future? The answer, lies in Maier's skepticism about any fundamental changes in German political culture during the past forty years. What is presented in this theory is the "enduring cliche" that in the absence of economic prosperity, Germany's commitment to Western values will weaken. Because of the Nazi past, an impossible negative burden of proof is still placed on the Federal Republic, by some observers, to demonstrate that it is not turning to the East, not abandoning the Western Alliance, or Western democratic values (22).

Conclusion

The German success story of the past forty years does not necessarily insure a blissful future for the Federal Republic, or its neighbors. On the contrary the stability and legitimacy of the postwar order has created conditions in which long-neglected questions such as national

identity and even reunification may occupy a prominent place on the national political Tagesordnung. Germany will become a more self-assertive and at time a more difficult partner for its allies in the next forty years. But these problems will be dealt with in the context of a consensus on democratic values and institutions never before present in German political history. This is the priceless legacy of the past forty years and the best hope for the future.

Notes

1. David P. Conradt, The German Polity, New York and London: Longman, 4th Edition, 1989, Chapter 3.

2. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 20-22.

3. Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy, New York: The Free Press, 1977, p. 6.

4. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 2-3.

5. Dahl, p. 3.

6. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, Vol. 5 (1968-1973), Allensbach: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1973, pp. 211 ff.

7. Eurobarometer, No. 17 (October, 1982).

8. For a summary of this work see David P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture", In G. Almond and S. Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited, Boston: Little-Brown, 1980, pp. 212-272.

9. For representative examples see B. Schaffner, Fatherland: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948: David Rodnick, Postwar Germans, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. H.V. Dicks, "Some Psychological Studies of German Character", in T.H. Pear, (ed.), Psychological Factors of Peace and War, New York: Philosophical Library, 1950.

10. See Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture...". See also Kendall L. Baker, et al, Germany Transformed, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1981. For German contributions see Klaus R. Allerbeck, Demokratisierung und sozialer Wandel in der BRD., Opladen:

Westdeutscher Verlag, 1976; Dieter Fuchs, Die Unterstuetzung des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989. For an important comparative study with German and American data see Gerda Lederer, "Trends in Authoritarianism: A Study of Adolescents in West Germany and the United States since 1945," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 13, no. 3 (September 1982), pp. 299-314.

11. Leonard Krieger who was an analyst for the U.S. Military Government has written about this period: "In general, apathy was the rule, an outer lethargy and inner emptiness so pervasive as to indicate not simply a state of shock in the face of catastrophe and the deadening routine of daily exercise in the face of a crushing struggle for survival, but a political withdrawal so profound as to mark the Nazi experience off from any traditional authoritarian analogy." See Leonard Krieger, "The Potential for Democratization in Occupied Germany: A Problem in Historical Projection," Public Policy, Vol. 17, 1968, p. 48. The OMGUS survey is cited in Max Kaase, "Bewusstseinslagen und Leitbilder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Werner Weidenfeld and Hartmut Zimmermann, eds., Deutschland Handbuch. Eine doppelte Bilanz 1949-1989, Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 1989, p. 205.

12. G.R. Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Decay of Support for Monarchy and the Hitler Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany," British Journal of Political Science, October, 1974, p. 465.

13. 1974 Political Action Study; 1981 European Values Study; 1981 CARA Values Survey cited in Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1988, p. 65.

14. EMNID, Informationen, Nos. 6/7, 1985, p. 15.

15. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Renate Koecher, Die verletzte Nation, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1987 for an extensive discussion of this argument. There is in fact a strong correlation (r=.75) between a country's level of national pride and its willingness to defend the country. (Computed from data in Eurobarometer, No. 24, December, 1985). Only 33 percent of the German respondents in this surveys stated they "would be willing to fight" for their country as compared to 61 percent of the British, 57 percent of the French and 38 percent of the Italian respondents. The twelve-nation European Community average was 48 percent. (Eurobarometer, No. 24, December, 1985).

16. Juergen Habermas, "Eine Art Schadensabwicklung," Die Zeit, July 11, 1986, reprinted in Historikerstreit, Munich:Piper Verlag, 1984, pp. 75-76.

17. David P. Conradt, Russell J. Dalton, "The West German Electorate and the Party System: Continuity and Change in the 1980s," Review of Politics, Winter, 1988, pp. 3-29.

18. These data are based on an analysis of the 1983 and 1987 Wahlstudien conducted by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in Mannheim. See Sabina Roessing, "The German Greens--From Protest Movement to 'Catch-All' Party," unpublished paper, University of Florida, April, 1989 for a further account of changes among Green voters.

19. Gerda Lederer, "Trends in Authoritarianism..."

20. Ronald Rogowski,"War, Trade and Domestic Politics," paper presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., p. 10.

21. Charles S. Maier, "Produktion und Rehabilitation. Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der amerikanischen Foerderung Westdeutschlands in der atlantischen Gemeinschaft der Nachkriegszeit," in Frank Trommler, ed., Amerika und die Deutschen, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986, pp. 54-68.

22. Maier, "Produktion und Rehabilitation...", p. 67.